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Abstract 
Yoweri Museveni’s tenure has been marked by a steady supply of aid in the form 
of budget support that covers almost half the national budget every year. The thesis 
argues that this form of aid with its predictable and reliable nature, combined with the 
free hand with which it gives the recipient country in making and implementing the 
budget makes it possible for the country’s elite to steal from public coffers. This loot is 
later used to fund Museveni’s further stay in office beyond the acceptable two term limit 
thus dealing a big blow to democracy in the country.  
For the country to democratise, the thesis recommends that budget support be 
drastically reduced, closely monitored or aid to come in a different form such as project 
support which is more transparent.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.1 Introduction 
 Development aid to Africa is supposed to accomplish a number of key objectives 
including the improvement of the economy, social conditions and, significant to this 
paper, to impact on political conditions. It is widely held especially by donors that 
development aid to African countries can contribute to increased democracy and 
improved governance. Notwithstanding this, however, evidence streaming from the 
continent tells a different story. Using Uganda as a case study, this thesis looks at the 
effect of development aid on democracy. The choice of Uganda was largely influenced 
by the country’s unique relationship with Western donor countries such as the United 
States of America (USA) and international lending institutions such as the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund. While other African countries faced sanctions for 
failing to observe the conditionalities laid down by the donors, Uganda managed to come 
out largely unscathed even though the Yoweri Museveni regime has failed to stick to the 
strict regulations set by the donors, one being democracy. 
This thesis contends that Foreign Aid and more specifically budget support which 
accounts for more than 50% of the Ugandan government’s annual budget is responsible 
for the government’s reluctance to pursue fiscal policy reforms that would enable it raise 
domestic resources, curb corruption and acts as a hindrance to meaningful political 
compromises with the Ugandan electorate that could lead to reforms geared towards a 
more transparent and accountable regime. Budget support is also a source of unearned 
revenue which is more reliable and predictable thus it makes corruption less hurtful to the 
economy but damaging on the political arena, more so on democracy. Scars of corruption 
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are easily covered up with more revenue coming from outside and deliberate efforts are 
made to ensure donor money is handled more transparently unlike the local revenue 
which is brazenly stolen. With budgetary needs taken care of, the government through its 
senior officials engages in grand corruption that helps nourish an elaborate patronage 
network which in turn suffocates all attempts at democratisation through its sheer 
financial muscle that stretches across the country thanks to the Resistance Councils and 
the unproportionate number of Districts whose officials are movement sympathisers with 
undying loyalty to the President. 
The paper examines the relationship between budget support and democracy and 
in the processes proves the hypothesis that the continued flow of aid to African countries 
is indirectly funding anti democracy forces. To be able to analyse the work, budget 
support is used as the independent variable while democracy is the dependent variable. 
This also informs the theoretical framework which has entirely been based on the 
dependent variable so as to effectively explain the independent variable. Corruption 
emerges as a very important intervening variable that helps link the two variables; budget 
support and democracy. Runaway corruption affords the dodgy regime an avenue to fund 
its further stay in power. Evidence such as irregular military deals, Museveni’s brother, 
Salim Saleh and other family member’s indulgencies together with senior minister’s 
involvement in graft is used to show how people with close ties to the president engage in 
graft with the aim of funding his stay in power. This is further compounded by the fact 
that their business, legal and political survival hinges on Museveni’s continued stay in 
office. 
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Uganda is used as a case study to show that budget support causes a breakdown in 
fiscal discipline, a situation that proves very ideal for corruption to thrive. The case of 
Uganda was largely influenced by President Yoweri Museveni’s successful attempt at a 
third term, growing murmurs about the state of corruption and democracy in the country 
and the seemingly healthy relationship the regime enjoys with western donors despite its 
many failings.  
Specific aims of the study included: 
· Presenting a theoretical framework for the study 
·  Providing an overview of budget support in reference to democracy using the 
case of Uganda 
· Contributing to the ongoing debates of development aid in Africa, democracy in 
Africa and the thorny issue of third presidential term politics. 
Much of the work relies on qualitative methodology with some limited use of quantitative 
methods to better explain figures used. For this, the University of the Witwatersrand 
libraries such as Cullen and the South African Institute of International Affairs provided 
the bulk of the desk-based research secondary data while Donald Rukare, a senior 
Ugandan government official working with the Good Governance and Human Rights 
program in the ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development gave crucial 
first-hand information about the state of democracy, corruption and aid in Uganda. The 
internet was also used mainly to gather information on Financial Institutions and 
governments including the Ugandan government. A combination of qualitative 
methodology and a bit of quantitative methodology ensures that the vast literature that 
exists on Uganda is supported by figures from governmental and non-governmental 
institutions which increases the validity of the work and makes it easy to understand the 
work. 
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1.2. CONCEPTUAL    FRAMEWORK 
Some of the key concepts that run across this work include democracy, 
democratisation, development aid, budget support, bilateral aid, multilateral aid and 
corruption. These concepts are discussed in the next section. 
1.2.1 Development Aid 
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) branch of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines development aid as the 
transfer abroad of public resources on concessional terms, to bring about an improvement 
in economic, political and social conditions in developing countries.1 
Development aid comprises resources that are channelled to developing countries, 
either directly or through the intermediary of a multilateral institution or private voluntary 
organisation for the purpose of supporting social and economic development. It is 
generally understood that aid is for independent countries with no constitutional links 
with the donors.2 With this in mind then it follows that all the assistance that African 
countries received from their colonial masters during the occupation period does not pass 
as development aid. The origin of aid has elicited different views on where and why 
countries and institutions started giving aid. 
Omatayo Argues that development aid originated in the late 50’s to essentially 
describe the flow of resources from institutions in North America and Europe to 
institutions and people of Africa, Asia and Latin America. He cites the need for rapid 
                                               
1 The Phenomenon of Foreign Aid, http://www.petersonistitute.org. 
2Brown, S Op cit. p 62 
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economic development as the reason why countries started calling for foreign aid.3                                              
Orjiako on the other hand traces the emergence of foreign aid to the end of colonialism 
when Africa nations started receiving aid from the US and later from their former 
colonial masters like Britain, France who aided their former colonies4.  
 Caroline Lancaster cites promotion of democracy, promotion of economic 
development and advancing security concerns, gaining commercial advantages and 
achieving cultural goals as some of the reasons why the West started giving aid.5 From 
the above exchanges it’s clear that different authors have different reasons but economic 
development emerges as the common denominator. 
Africa’s rich mineral resources will count to nothing without the technological know-how 
and the manpower necessary to procure economic development. This is why it was 
necessary to source for the manpower and money in order to kick-start the economies. 
  High rates of illiteracy and an underdeveloped infrastructure are also singled out 
as some of the reasons why the continent still lags behind. Africa is still steeped in 
poverty hence the pouring of aid, Carlsson thinks that Africa is attracting aid in order to 
fight poverty by supporting the economic growth but he laments that there has never been 
any positive correlation between aid and growth.6 The West started giving aid to the 
continent with a belief that it would serve the dual purpose of raising investments and 
also increasing the volumes of exports. 
                                               
3 Omatayo, O: Foreign Aid, Self reliance and Economic Development in West Africa, 
Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport, CT, 1996, p.14 
4 Orjiako, H: Killing Sub-Saharan Africa With Aid, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2000, 
pg. 1 
5 Lancaster, C: Aid to Africa: So much to do, so little done, University of Chicago press, Chicago, 
1999, p.74 
6 Carlsson, J, Samolekae, G and Van De Walle, G: Foreign Aid in Africa: Learning from the 
country experience, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, 1997, p. 7. 
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The other reason for aid and which was on the lips of most African leaders was to 
facilitate industrialisation which was seen as a quick escape route from the straight jacket 
of underdevelopment. Omatayo reckons that industrialising at the level of import 
substitution alone was not enough hence the need for foreign capital which was seen as 
compatible with economic development objectives.7 
  Africa’s dependency on aid has been rising over the years and this is a direct 
reflection of the continents state of development. More aid means that the continent is 
still in a bad shape as far as economic development is concerned. 
 In 1990 the total commitments made by development assistance committee 
members to African economies was $ 17.3 Billion but in 2004 it had ballooned to $ 34.2 
Billion8. In the past three decades Africa has already received more than $ 500 Billion in 
aid from the international community. The estimated new Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) that Africa can effectively use in both infrastructure and human 
development ranges from $ 14 billion to $ 18 billion per year for 2006- 2008.9 During the 
G8 summit in Gleneagles the G8 agreed to commit an additional $25 billion in annual aid 
to Africa by 2010 and give Africa substantial aid relief.10 There has been a notable 
increase in aid from as low as $135 in 1980 to the staggering amounts seen today.11The 
EU is singled out as having provided the most ODA, 53% of all projects and 
compensatory funding for Sub-Saharan Africa.12 
                                               
7 Omatayo, O, Op Cit. p. 14. 
8 African Development Bank, African Development Report: Aid, Debt Relief and Development in 
Africa, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 1. 
 
9 Loc Cit. 
10 Loc Cit. 
11 Orjiako, H, Op Cit. p. xiv 
12 Loc Cit. 
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1.2.2 Bilateral aid 
  This is the aid given directly from one government to another. Individual donor 
governments are both the sources and channels of assistance (via aid implementing 
agencies). It’s often accompanied by certain conditions required by donor countries.13 
This is where political conditionalities comes in since the donor country might demand 
reform either in the economic or political structure of the recipient country as a 
conditionality for the aid. 
 
 
1.2.3 Multilateral aid 
  This is aid that countries contribute to international agencies like the World Bank, 
its administration and governance is shared between the country that gives and the agency 
that gets it. An important difference between multilateral aid and bilateral aid is that, 
while in the later there is direct intense political and commercial pressure, the former 
doesn’t encounter too much pressure. It’s also important to note that aid of this kind 
mostly goes towards the development needs of the recipient country. 
 
1.2.4 Democracy 
  Democracy comes in contending conceptions that makes it difficult to come up 
with one distinct definition. However for quick understanding the concepts that will be 
defined under this section are those fronted by Robert Dahl and Joseph Schumpeter. Dahl 
                                               
13 Ibid. p. 71 
 16
defines democracy as the holding of regular elections which are free and fair, adherence 
to certain rights and freedoms like the freedom of speech, media and different political 
parties to be allowed to compete for power.14 Larry Diamond echoes similar sentiments 
but cautions that if political authority is to be constrained and balanced, individual rights 
protected, and rule of law assured, democracy requires a constitution that is supreme to 
put things in order.15 Liberal democracy is therefore baptised as constitutional democracy 
due to heavy reliance on good constitutions. On his part Schumpeter sees democracy in a 
narrower sense where he defines it as a situation where individuals acquire the power to 
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote. To him the power is not 
vested in the electorate but in the few individuals given the mandate to lead.16 The study 
adopts Dahl’s definition since it represents the modern day western democracy which is 
liberal democracy. 
 
1.2.5 Democratisation 
Okuku defines democratisation as the change of a non-democratic state into a 
democratic one. Its often taken in the context of society where it refers to the 
transformation in its political culture, from passive, non-participant citizens becoming 
more active and not only insisting that the state be alive to their aspirations, but also 
keeping a check on state power and providing constructive direction to its policies 
through regular and active participation in the political and development process.17 
                                               
14 Dahl, R Op cit. p. 85 
15 Diamond, L: Defining and Developing Democracy in Dahl, R and Shapiro, I: The Democracy 
Sourcebook, The MIT Press, Massachusetts, 2003, p.35. 
16 Schumpeter, J: Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, George Allen and Unwin ltd, London, 
1943, p.262 
17 Okuku, J Op cit. p.9 
 17
 
1.2.6 Corruption 
Corruption is generally described as the abuse of government authority for private 
benefit where an official entrusted with carrying out a task by the public engages in some 
sort of malfeasance for private enrichment.18 This definition is also shared by the World 
Bank and Transparency International. Uganda holds position 126 out of 180 on the 
corruption Perception Index (CPI) released by Transparency International in 2008. 
1.2.7 Budget support 
Budget support has been defined as a method of financing a partner country’s 
budget through the transfer of resources from the external financing agency to the 
partner’s treasury thereby making up part of the total treasury budget.19 Donors are 
allowed little if any influence on individual spending once resources are transferred. 
Budget support is more like a partnership where aid involving bilateral donors and 
international financial institutions is channelled to the recipient country. Unlike project 
support which creates a parallel system outside the government system and there is also 
increased disbursements and tends to move away from conditionalities.20 
Another important fact about budget support is that its predictable and financial 
assistance is timely to those countries that are committed to sound policies.21 
                                               
18 Bardham, P: Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues in Arnold, J Heidenheimer and 
Michael Johnston (eds): Political Corruption: Concepts and contexts, Transaction Publishers, 
New Jersey, 2001, p. 322. 
19 Koeberle, S and Starveski, Z: Budget Support: Concepts and Issues in Koeberle, S, Starveski, Z 
and Walliser, J: Budget Support as a more effective Aid? Recent Experiences and Emerging 
Lessons, World Bank Publications, 2006, p. 6. 
20 Loc Cit. 
21 Loc Cit. 
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 By letting the recipient country factor in the resources into its budget it increases 
ownership and strengthens domestic accountability since the funds are subjected to 
normal parliamentary scrutiny process.22 It also works well where both the donor and the 
recipient country share similar priorities in terms of budgetary resource allocation and 
both believe in the credibility of the governments economic policies.23 
   With a good grasp of the concepts above it becomes easier to analyse some of the 
materials that closely relate to this in order to fill in the gaps that might have been left. 
 
1.3. Literature review 
 A look at some of the published work that relates to this thesis yields very good 
results. It’s evident that extensive research has been done on the case of Uganda with 
corruption, democracy and foreign aid being the dominant themes. However, the authors 
leave some gaping spaces which this literature review shows and the research tries to fill. 
Authors such as Orjiako do well in articulating the relationship between donors and the 
Ugandan government and how this has been futile in promoting democracy. The use of 
aid in promotion of democracy is not a new phenomena, it started in earnest with the 
collapse of communism.24 Why the sudden fixation with democracy?    In his book 
“Killing sub-Sahara Africa with aid” Humphrey Orjiako attributes this to the 
assumption in the West that democratic societies are more likely to adopt open market 
                                               
22 Koeberle, S, Starveski, Z and Walliser, J: Budget Support as a more effective Aid? Recent 
Experiences and Emerging Lessons, World Bank Publications, 2006, p. xvii. 
 
23 Muduuli, M: Workshop on Budget Support: The Ugandan Example, Muduuli is a Deputy 
Secretary in The Treasury; the workshop was held in 2004. 
24 Orjiako, H, Op Cit.p.65 
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oriented economic policies and create more growth friendly environments.25 Aid is 
given(or countries are ‘aided’) to adopt or maintain democratic political institutions and 
private enterprise –based economies in the capitalist mould. The west does not hesitate to 
use all means at its disposal to democratise Africa one being aid conditionality, however 
he rubbishes the kind of democracy practiced in Africa terming it as a mere periodic 
elections usually manipulated to confirm the mandate of incumbent governors.26 The 
evaluation is not far from the truth since evidence available shows that in Africa 
incumbents rarely lose an election. Those who lose manipulate the results in their favour. 
This makes him doubt the sincerity of donors in promoting democracy whom he thinks 
are only interested in fronting their own interests at the expense of democracy promotion.  
  The notion that democracy is necessary for economic growth also comes under 
fire from Orjiako who gives the example of China and other East Asian countries that 
have achieved tremendous growth without democratically elected governments in place. 
For Orjiako the important ingredients to growth are prudent management of the economy 
and the elimination of corruption and that democracy is just an excuse to front other 
strategic interests. He however reminds us that democracy is important to give a peaceful 
atmosphere which is conducive for economy to grow. In essence what Orjiako is saying 
is that donors knew what was important for economic growth and it was not necessarily 
democracy but prudent management of economy. This explains why Uganda was let off 
the hook and why other countries faced sanctions. To him donors  invoked democracy in 
order to attend to a variety of vested interests in different countries at the same time. 
Democracy was arguably the most attractive denominator due to its popularity at the 
                                               
25 Ibid. 66 
26 Loc. Cit. 
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time. Stephen Brown adds that aid is much more than just a carefully administered flow 
of resources. It is a basis for contemporary international relationships both political and 
commercial, a conduit of influence as well as goodwill.27 The donors have been met with 
varying degrees of success due to a myriad of factors.   
In Democracy and Multiparty politics in Africa, Makinda does well in pointing 
out some of the factors that makes it difficulty for aid to be an agent of democracy. First 
he begins by attributing the failure of aid to yield the desired results to the fact that 
different countries have different histories and democracy cannot just be transplanted 
anywhere.28  He cites various reasons why aid has failed to spur democracy in Africa 
which includes the inappropriateness of certain Western ideas and practices, the 
inexperience of leaders in running multiparty systems and the general political, economic 
and social conditions.29 Uganda’s economic, social and political conditions were very 
shaky hence the country was thought not to be ready for multiparty democracy. Structural 
Adjustment Programmes also come under criticism from Makinda whereby he blames 
them for affecting the common people and in the end they politically destabilise and 
undermine socio-economic conditions under which multiparty democracy generally 
flourishes.30 This concurs with other authors and even Museveni who wondered how a 
population with so many poor people was expected to democratise. 
            Makinda blames donors for lacking commitment or do not follow up the political 
reforms as vigorously as they do the economic reforms hence the little that has been 
                                               
27 Browne, S: Foreign Aid in Practice, Pinter publishers, London, 1990, p.xv 
28 Makinda, S: Democracy and Multiparty politics in Africa, Journal of Modern Studies, 34(4), 
1996, pp 555-573. 
 
29 Ibid. p.10 
30Ibid. p. 16  
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achieved soon crumbles. Other interests have also overshadowed the glamour for 
democracy; security is now given priority especially in the wake of September 2001 
terrorist attack.31  
          Donors often employ different strategies with varying degrees of success in their 
quest to democratise the continent, some of the strategies used have been pointed out by 
Bruce Heilman and Laurean Ndumbaro. In “Democratic Transitions in East Africa” 
they explain that in their quest to introduce democracy in East Africa donors employed 
two basic strategies; dialogue and political conditionality for aid. This depended on donor 
interests, the willingness of East African leaders to implement political and economic 
reforms and the desire to maintain cooperation in other fields.32  Museveni was successful 
in implementing economic reforms that made the donors look the other way when it came 
to political reforms. The books talks of how Museveni used the excuse of insecurity and 
heightened ethnic tensions to avoid multiparty democracy and cites a lack of agreement 
among donors on the best way to promote democracy, counter measures taken by ruling  
regimes to maintain grip on power and individual interests of donors as some of the 
reasons that deflected attention from democracy.33  
Donors were also determined to present Uganda as a success story to serve as an 
example to other African countries.34 In other words he was the blue eyed-boy of the 
West. The Ugandan leader was bravely adopting some structural adjustment programs 
and the economy was doing quite well under Museveni, these were reasons enough to 
overlook the democratisation bit, after all Museveni had presented the movement system 
                                               
31 Ibid. p.12 
32 Heilman, B and Ndumbaro, L: “International Context” in Wafula, F and Kaiser, J. (eds): 
Democratic Transitions in East Africa, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004. p.142. 
33 Loc Cit. 
34 Ibid. p. 157. 
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as an alternative political system.35 The movement system is whereby he banned all 
political parties leaving the National Resistance Movement as the only party by which 
one could seek a political office. The West bought into his idea and this explains why 
Museveni was able to escape the purge that fell on other African leaders like Moi of 
Kenya because of not carrying out political reforms. Donors did more harm to Uganda’s 
democracy with their ill advised intention to have Museveni as the poster boy of 
economic reforms. It’s clear that from early on Museveni was a shrewd operator who 
knew how to arm-twist the donors into giving him money. Museveni also cut the image 
of a strong regional leader who could be relied on to cooperate with the West when need 
be. The volatile situation in the region influenced this decision. The authors did quite well 
in bringing out the issues that made Museveni escape democratic reforms that were 
sweeping Africa but just like other authors, Heilman and Ndumbaro do not make any 
attempt to link the money being poured into the country and how it affects democracy, 
the more reason why more research in this area is needed. 
                  In the journal “Authoritarian leaders and Multiparty elections in Africa: 
How foreign donors help to keep Kenya’s Daniel Arap Moi in power” Stephen 
Brown analyses how the donors on several occasions thwarted attempts by the opposition 
to effect reforms before elections were held by pressurising the opposition to enter into a 
contest that was heavily tilted in favour of the incumbent 36 By going into an election 
with the then constitution the opposition stood little chance of emerging victorious and 
the process was never going to be democratic. Soon after the elections the donors were on 
the forefront of endorsing Moi’s government even though they were aware that the 
                                               
35 Loc Cit. 
36Brown, S: Authoritarian leaders and Multiparty elections in Africa: How Foreign donors help to 
keep Kenya’s Daniel Arap Moi in power, Third world Quarterly, Vol.22, No.5, 2001, p. 725-739.  
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process was not free and fair.37 They also resumed lending soon after the two elections of 
1992 and 1997 further throwing the back the reform agenda because no meaningful 
changes had been made, this shows that donors were more interested in the election than 
helping change the whole democracy component38 Brown’s work on Kenya is useful for 
the research on Uganda as it highlights some of the mistakes that the donors committed 
and in the processes enabled the Kenyan president to easily side-step democracy and 
retain power. A lot can be borrowed from this journal to help understand better the 
relationship that donors have with the Ugandan leader and if this relationship is 
encouraging Museveni to overlook democracy. 
          He also acknowledges that more research needs to be done to find out more on the 
external influence on democracy. Most research has focussing on giving reasons why 
certain countries were coerced while others were given the option of dialogue, the 
attention is also on the early 90s period but since democratisation is a gradual process that 
takes place over a long time we need to examine the current aid regime and how the 
ongoing democratisation process is being affected. 
Brown also concludes that donors’ involvement is bad for democracy ‘limited 
intervention by donors’ leads to a more sustained democratisation process as seen in the 
case of Kenya where the movement was largely domestically driven’.39 
              Ellen Hauser’s work in “Uganda’s relations with western donors in the 90s: 
What impact on democratisations” will have a great input in this research. She looks at 
how Uganda’s democratisation was stalled from very early on because of donors’ soft 
                                               
37Ibid. p .9 
38 Ibid. p.10 
39Ibid. p.12  
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approach.40 Donors opted for dialogue with the Museveni government unlike in Kenya 
where they preferred a coercive approach. She explains that Uganda was given 
preferential treatment because it was just recovering from Amin’s reign and also there 
was a need to maintain good relations with Uganda in order to pursue other foreign policy 
goals41 she is quick to add that donor interests influenced their decisions not to threaten 
Uganda, “they wanted an ally in the East African region”42 She also made interesting 
conclusions that a country’s level of dependency is not a determining factor. This means 
that a country can be heavily dependent but still democratise while others with little 
linkage to the donors can still go backwards in terms of democracy. The example of 
Uganda should therefore not be construed to mean that it is failing to democratise 
because it’s heavily depended but rather look at some other causes. 
    Hauser’s work lays the foundation which this research intends to use to come up 
with a more conclusive work that not only touches on the early 90s donor involvement 
but also focuses on how this dependency has over time created a culture of patronage and 
corruption. The budget support role that the aid plays will be examined to find out 
whether it’s responsible for the low revenue collection and how this can encourage 
corruption and a patronage system that cannot accommodate democracy. The journal 
does a great job bringing out the issues that informed the donor’s decision to give aid and 
also brings out the negative impact this relationship was going to have on democracy. 
However, the work comes out as rather vague and does not pinpoint the real area that is 
affected and this where my work picks up from. Unlike Hauser who looks at the broad 
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spectrum of possible causes, this research intends to focus on the particular area of budget 
support.  
  Though unrelated, events in Rwanda prior to the genocide just demonstrates how a 
patronage system that is so entrenched and close to the leader can be so stubborn to 
change that the President basically operates at its whims. Its very difficult to effect 
change in a country where the elite is benefiting from the present set-up, a status quo is 
always favoured.  
   Juma Okuku’s book titled “Ethnicity, state power and the democratisation 
process in Uganda” decries the conspicuous silence that the donors have treated 
Uganda’s democratisation unlike in Kenya where IMF and the World Bank actually cut 
off aid43 He also points out that what Western donors wanted was political and economic 
stability and not necessarily democracy. He observes that Ugandans have run out of 
patience with the international community’s ability to help democratise their country and 
warns that with limited space for democratic organisation, non-democratic means might 
be pursued to realise democracy.44 By allowing the donors to drive the reform agenda 
Ugandans are now realising its futility and are now shopping for alternative ways to bring 
about democracy. Okuku is worried that Ugandans might be getting impatient with the 
way their country is democratising and this might force people to use unconstitutional 
means to achieve what they want. He also prefers a situation where Ugandans take the 
initiative themselves instead of waiting for donors to initiate it since to him the donors 
might be preoccupied with other issues other than democracy.  
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Kenya’s situation although painful also offers an important lesson that the less a 
country relies on aid the likely its going to democratise quickly. This statement clashes 
with Hauser’s assertion that the level of dependency is irrelevant. The clash in the views 
of these scholars especially on the level of dependency highlights the need for further 
research in this area. The most important part of Okuku’s work is the prominence that he 
gives to internal forces to bring about democracy; this view is also shared by Stephen 
Brown whose work on Kenya demonstrates how a domestically driven democratic 
agenda can be successful. Kenya suffered several aid cuts but it has turned out to be a 
blessing as it helped the government rely heavily on its people for revenue; the result was 
a successful taxation system that is able to collect enough revenue which reduces the 
reliance on donors. A tight tax system is also reputed for taming corruption by sealing 
loopholes that would have been used by elites to fund anti-democracy movements. Again 
the political elites have a tendency to divert local revenue to other uses if they realise that 
they have another source from outside. With the knowledge of how the Kenyan situation 
has unfolded the research on Uganda will be better understood.  
This literature review makes us understand how Museveni’s regime has managed to get 
an uninterrupted supply of donor goodies and why the goodies have not translated into 
the desired result which is democracy. A historical background has also been advanced 
shedding some light on the operation of foreign aid and how African governments have 
feared as far as aid and democracy is concerned.  
From the literature it’s clear that no one has attempted to link the particular type of 
aid called budget support and democracy. That Uganda has received a lot of scholarly 
attention is not in doubt but this thesis goes a step further and pinpoints a particular type 
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of aid which has played a significant part in the state of democracy in the country. The 
fact that Uganda as a country is given almost a free hand in the use of aid that comes as 
budget support gives another dimension to the study of Uganda and the twin problems of 
aid and democracy. 
The next chapter will look at democratic theory with a view of understanding 
some of the positions taken by eminent theorists in relation to the brand favoured by 
Museveni. It will also be useful in explaining why the continent is hesitant to embrace 
this concept that has now become the yardstick of governance in the world. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
            Aid conditionality and sanctions are used as instruments to pressure or persuade 
regimes to do politically what they would otherwise not do: become democratic. This is 
done by offering rewards or imposing costs greater than the costs the regimes perceive 
from the conditions demanded.45 The mere fact that African countries are poor and 
underdeveloped makes them susceptible to the demands of the donors. 
      In order to successfully carry out this research the use of democratic theory will be 
vital. Democracy is the theme under the spotlight with budget support being used as a 
dependent variable to explain it.  
 
2.1.1 Democratic theory 
   Graeme Duncan reminds us that democracy is a rare and a desirable political form 
which is vulnerable in theory and practice and always incomplete in certain aspects.46 
The successes and more so the failure of democratic practices in the world has been 
instrumental in shaping the democratic theories that are in use today, good example being 
the total failure of socialism in countries like Tanzania. The end of the cold war also left 
the socialist branch of democracy badly wounded and now all states that attempt to 
practice a different form of democracy other than liberal democracy are not deemed 
democratic. 
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  Events have tended to influence the emergence of a scientific democratic theory 
which is mostly associated with Joseph Schumpeter, Here theorisation relies on evidence. 
However, before Schumpeter came on the scene, democratic theory was safely tucked 
under the classical theory or the Athenian democratic theory. This theory is notable for 
having both sworn enemies who criticize it at every turn and also staunch supporters who 
do not hesitate to defend it. It has attractive political ideals such as equality among 
citizens, liberty, respect for law and justice.47 Another notable feature of classical theory 
is its commitment to the principle of civic virtues, which is a dedication to the republican 
city-state and subordination of private life to public affairs and the common good. It was 
also marked by unity, solidarity, participation, public deliberation and a highly restricted 
citizenship.48 A closer look reveals that classical theory of democracy has contributed 
immensely on the modern liberal democracy. 
       However classical democratic theory has come under heavy criticism with most of it 
focusing on descriptive elements of the theory on its most basic conceptions of 
citizenship, representation and decision-making. The notion that citizens are active, 
informed and democratic comes under heavy criticism. This is due to the fact that very 
few such people as described in the classical theory who can participate fully in political 
affairs are found in the world, including those countries that claim to be highly 
democratic.49 
       The inadequacies observed in the classical theory especially on the issue of 
participation have resulted in the birth of a revisionist movement which aims to bring the 
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classical theory closer to reality. Joseph Schumpeter was among the first people to 
challenge this normative and value-laden theory of democracy. His criticism came in the 
book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy which among other important things came 
up with a more realistic definition of democracy. 
   His main criticism focused on the central participatory and decision-making role 
of the people which clearly rested on a shaky ground. He contends that it’s the potential 
decision makers who compete for people’s vote. He gives democracy a new definition 
where he defines it as a situation where individuals acquire the power to decide by means 
of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote. To him the power is not vested in the 
electorate but in the few individuals given the mandate to lead.50 To some this definition 
is more realistic as it takes into account what is observed on the ground and doesn’t just 
make assumptions as is the case with the classical definition. To others the definition is 
narrower as it is limited to the procedural aspects of democracy thus lumping together 
those countries that have stifled individual freedoms and rights like Malaysia or 
Zimbabwe with those that observe a high degree of the same such as Japan. Interestingly 
there are those who use Schumpeter’s definition as long as it serves them well, it’s not 
uncommon for countries like Malaysia to get compliments from the West when certain 
interests are at stake.  
Schumpeter comes under fire from Alan Crawson who takes issue with his 
assertion that only elected leaders have the power to make decisions, arguing that there 
exists sectarian interest which also have a voice, a point that was brought to the fore by 
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Schumpeter himself.51 Critics of the democratic theory also point to the tendency of 
social organisations to coalesce towards orligachical control, the masses are soon 
forgotten and power gets into the heads of those elected. Decision making becomes 
centralised rather than decentralised. 
Although an attempt at coming up with a single theory of democracy is elusive, 
Graeme Duncan suggests that an adequate theory of democracy must contain the 
following elements: an account of values or principles which democratic institutions are 
to realise like rule of the people, or popular choice between candidates for government; a 
specification of the political model which best or most realistically achieves that end; and 
a justification of the preference for those principles and that institutional set against 
others.52 When you throw in rights and freedoms then you move closer to liberal 
democratic theory which is closely associated with Dahl. 
   Dahl defines Democracy as where every member can vote weight assigned to 
each vote and is identical meaning that equality is upheld and the person with most votes 
win, one is also free to choose whoever he/she likes.53 What Dahl is referring to is the 
modern day liberal democracy and in a liberal democracy we have guarantees of 
freedoms, adherence to the constitution and regularly free multiparty elections. The 
introduction of freedoms and rights is what sets apart this version of democracy from 
what is fronted by Schumpeter. Larry Diamond stresses the need to have a good 
constitution in place in order for liberal democracy to succeed. He gives the example of 
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third world countries as lacking good constitutions or not respecting the one in use as a 
reason why they have failed to embrace liberal democracy.54 
   In his book “The social contract” Rousseau acknowledges that there has never 
been a true democracy and never will be. It is contrary to the natural order that the greater 
number should govern and smaller number be governed.55 Rousseau is notable for 
stressing rights in his theorisation of democracy 
Other critics of democracy also point to the futility of the majority to rule; to them a small 
minority always assumes the mantle and starts making unilateral decisions once the dust 
has settled.  
  A useful critic of the liberal democracy comes from the Marxists who 
inadvertently help the democratic theory make forays into the world of economics. 
Marxist theory is able to expand a rather political subject into economics thereby giving a 
much broader democracy. Marxists see democracy as the highest form of the capitalist 
state, to be supported as a progressive demand against autocracy but condemned if seen 
as an ultimate aim.56 Marx and Engels read sinister motives in the liberal democratic 
theory and did not hesitate to link it to some domination, Levin observed thus “we find 
Marx and Engels arrived at designation of a democratic political structure not far 
removed from contemporary notions. Thus it’s marked by an emphasise on 
constitutionalism, civic liberties, representative government based on universal franchise. 
Selfish and corrupt politicians misused democratic structures for their own 
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aggrandisement.”57 Could the same be said of selfish Western countries? The answer is 
yes going by Marxist’s assessment since the West has been benefiting immensely from 
Africa’s resources and this is even made easier by globalisation and this is where the 
dependency theory comes in. Wallenstein, a dependency theorist sees the World as 
basically structured as an increasingly interrelated system of strong core states and 
peripheral weak ones, this way the world scale division and integration of production 
increases.58 Here all states are linked in one economic flow which is greatly aided by the 
democratic values. Fortunately, Africa is aided to remain relevant in this system by 
receiving aid but going by observation of the authors, the aim of this aid might be to 
create a situation that props Africa so that it remains a useful cog in the world system to 
the benefit of the West. These views are also echoed by Dudley Seers, Gunder Frank and 
Samir Amin.  
        In Africa there has been a consensus among some African authors such as Ake and 
Adedeji who feel that Western democracy is not appropriate for Africa, to them this kind 
of democracy is incompatible with the organisation and management of political power in 
Africa, and it rejects the socio-cultural realities of Africa.59 Democratisation in Africa 
will be sustainable and credible only if it comes as an integral part of the transformation 
of the continent’s political and socioeconomic structures. These views were shared by 
Africa’s independence fathers such as Nyerere, Senghor and Kwame Nkrumah. On 
gaining independence African leaders faced growing pressure from former Colonial 
                                               
57 Ibid. P. 80. 
58 Wallenstein, I and Hopkins, K: World Systems Analysis- Theory and Methodology, Sage Publications, 
Beverly Hills, California, 1982, P. 43. 
59 Ake, C: The Unique Case of African Democracy, International Affairs, Vol.62, No.2, April 1993, p.242 
 34
masters to democratise but the general consensus was that African values were against 
the individualistic tendencies of the Europeans.  
  The idea of a uniquely African style democracy was mooted by Nyerere favouring 
a theory of democracy based on consensus and community but this did not mean that he 
ruled out democracy completely since he was also warm to the idea of a democratic 
scheme based on representation and accepts the idea of a parliamentary system where the 
elected representatives can give voice to the interests of their constituents. Nyerere’s 
consensus is a radical one as it involves doing away with political parties and settling for 
one ruling party. He sees a situation where democracy is possible in one party unlike 
many parties that will split the country along communities. The fact that this ignores 
rights and freedoms of citizens was totally overlooked by Nyerere. This line of thinking 
does not surprise many since most African leaders have used it as a defence of their 
autocratic rule.  
Nyerere might have been sincere in his suggestion but that cannot be said of his 
African counterparts who readily borrowed into the idea in order to fend off the 
opposition, non illustrates this better than Museveni who in 1994 lashed at liberal 
democracy as not ideal for Africa, he cited class as the reason why democracy thrives in 
Europe and the United States and wondered how Uganda with a 94% peasant population 
would accommodate democracy without dividing people along tribal, regional or religion 
lines.60 Indeed this was the premise of his non-party democratic system. The fact that 
donors were willing to accommodate Museveni’s idea of democracy only shows that they 
were not really committed to bringing political change but only interested in an 
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environment that can allow their structural adjustment programmes to take effect. An 
insightful paper by Joseph Hanlon on Mozambique best describes donor behaviour, he 
portrays donors as having selective amnesia as far as their interests are concerned, they 
see what they want to see and the ruling elite knows this thus avoids doing what upsets 
the donors like stealing donor funds, instead they rob banks, skim public contracts, 
demand shares in investments and ensure that the justice system does not work61.      
Similarly donors see rapid growth in GDP, growing exports and general growth around 
urban centres and ignore the poverty in rural areas, donors are also treated to stage 
managed elections that are far from being democratic. This work on Mozambique can be 
used to explain why Museveni’s government continued receiving donor funding even 
though his sentiments and actions were ruining democracy in Uganda.  
     However democracy is encouraged since its believed that a democratic regime 
will uphold accountability, this is also one of the reasons why aid is given to democratic 
regimes because it is believed that such a government puts the funds given to good use, 
but this assertion has been contested by Paul Hirst who argues that a democracy can at 
times deliver very low levels of government accountability and public influence on 
decision making.62 Museveni’s favoured version of democracy has done exactly that; 
where as it has met the bare minimum requirements needed to hoodwink the donors into 
loosening the purse, the regime has gone off track as far as accountability is concerned. 
    This thesis will therefore adopt Dahl’s definition as it emphasises political 
freedom and the government is clearly mandated to ensure individuals can access a wide 
range of options and values that goes along way in promoting self development unlike 
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Schumpeter’s definition which, among other things endorses regime types like 
Museveni’s Uganda where one party dominance and control of the state over state 
machinery to influence electoral results is the norm. Liberal democracy breeds 
accountability and the freedoms and values it promotes goes hand in hand with what 
donor aid aims to achieve at the end of the day. Donors have made it clear they are 
promoting liberal democracy since it promotes freedoms and rights which helps an 
individual to fully realise his/her potential. 
The following section will look at some of the raging debates on democracy in 
Africa. Not all Africans share the same views as far as democracy is concerned as 
illustrated in the next section. 
2.2 African debate on Democracy 
 
  Liberal and Participatory democracy have given rise to a lively debate among 
prominent African scholars on the model that best suits the African continent. The debate 
has drawn in heavyweights such as the late Claude Ake, Owusu, Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o, 
Mamdani, Jibrin Ibrahim, Mkandawire and Issa Shivji amongst others. The debate has 
been revolving around those that support the Universal principles of democracy with 
multi-partyism taking the centre stage and those that call for a revised one that puts 
African realities at the forefront. Anyang’ Nyong’o stands out as a fierce proponent of the 
latter while Claude Ake is the poster boy for the former. Other commentators on African 
democracy were also sucked into the raging debate and were forced to take sides with 
scholars such as Bratton and Rothchild and Bayart coming out strongly in support of the 
Nyong’o version while the likes of Mkandawire and Zaleza sided with Claude Ake. 
Francis Fukuyama gave the pro-democracy activists a shot in the arm with his 
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controversial book titled ‘End of History: Last man standing. The book basically 
presented democracy as the endpoint of mankind’s ideological evolution and the 
universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government63. 
This was music to the ears for those who had started agitating for democracy especially 
on the African continent. 
  According to Ake, the drive for democracy in Africa can be traced to the failed 
take-off at independence.64 Ordinary citizens felt let down and started to openly call for 
the second independence in order to address their sorry economic state.65 To some, this 
economic independence as Ake puts it, could only be attained though democracy but 
others still had reasons to resist democracy. 
  According to Robert Dahl liberal democracy is characterised by periodic elections 
contested under different political parties. Under this arrangement each individual has 
one vote and is free to cast it for his or her favourite candidate. The person that gets the 
most votes is declared the winner and the party that gets the majority usually forms the 
government. Another important tenet of liberal democracy concerns the procedural aspect 
whereby elections must be held in a free and fair environment and also civil and political 
liberties have to be respected.66 
Skinner points out that liberal democracy culminates in a majority rule but this has 
historically only been possible where the social, political, economic and industrial set-ups 
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are superior.67 This is a blow to those advocating for this kind of political dispensation on 
the African continent that is lacking in economic power and lagging behind in industrial 
development.  
         Schumpeter offers a different view on democracy and defines it as a situation where 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people’s vote.68 To him the power is not vested in the electorate but is in the hands of the 
few individuals given the mandate to lead.  
             Edigheji Omano decries the fact that democracy on the continent has neglected 
issues of economic justice such as food, shelter, medical care and housing. He reckons 
that liberal democracy has no place on the continent if at all it’s not addressing issues that 
afflict the majority of the people.69 The autocratic regimes that reigned supreme in the 
eighties are loathed and people want to do away with them but that’s not all; at the back 
of the people’s minds is how to put in place a regime that addresses their socio economic 
plight. Early on in the sixties, writers such as Bhagwati were convinced that democracy 
and economic development cannot go together. He was basically advocating for 
authoritarianism as the best remedy for underdevelopment especially in poor continents 
like Africa. In the eighties the story was not different, just before the wave of 
democratisation swept the continent, most developmental economists were leaning 
heavily towards state-led development whereby the state nationalises and becomes the 
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single biggest shareholder in most economic entities. These were the people who thought 
that economic development preceded democracy.70  
                Amartya Sen, the celebrated economist and a respected political commentator 
differs with this assumption that democracy can not thrive amidst poverty. He proclaims 
that the protective role of democracy maybe particularly important for the poor. People in 
economic need also need a political voice which can only be found through democracy. 
He adds that democracy is not a luxury that can wait the arrival of general prosperity.71 
Sen also doubts that given a choice poor people will reject democracy and that poor 
people don’t care about civil and political rights. The truth is that poor people will be 
happier to advance their civil and political rights but he is quick to caution that 
democracy and majority rule are two different things.72 According to Sen, in addition to 
voting and respect for election results, democracy also requires the protection of liberties 
and freedoms, respect for legal entitlements and the guaranteeing of free discussion and 
uncensored  distribution of news and fair comment.73  
         During the colonial period, the European masters were more interested in resource 
exploitation and democracy did not feature in their plans. The scenario was also replayed 
during the cold war whereby the competing powers were keen to get allies across the 
globe including in Africa regardless of the types of regimes they were heading.74 The 
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debate on democracy on the African continent is endemic to the never ending 
development discourse. The opinions being raised on democracy have very much to do 
with the economic situation on the continent. According to Stephen Ndegwa, the 
economic crises that faced autocratic leaders were the main reason for the success of the 
challenge of authoritarianism.75 The newly democratically elected leaders were going to 
be judged on how well they handled the economy and if they did not steer the economy 
well then the masses were going to revert back to the formerly authoritarian leaders for 
salvation. Ndegwa gives the re-election of Benin’s exe-president Mathieu Kereoku and 
Madagascar’s Didier Ratisirika as good examples.76 
            The confrontations on African democracy has seen scholars take on each other 
with one battle being waged between what could be called the right and the left, some 
viewed it as a generation gap as Jibrin Ibrahim identified the anti-liberal tendency with 
‘icons’ such as Archie Mafeje, Samir Amin, Claude Ake, Mahmood Mamdani, Issa shivji 
and Ernest Wamba dia Wamba.77 All were presumed to be Marxists  because they spent 
too much of their intellectual careers demolishing liberalism but the fact that countries 
such as Kenya that had just adopted liberal democracy had masses of people remaining 
poor vindicated them.78 In the other corner we had the likes of Anyang Nyong’o and 
Jibrin Ibrahim who were ardent supporters of liberalism because they believed that liberal 
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democracy was the answer to Africa’s economic decay.79 Others such as Mkandawire just 
supported democracy and whether it brought development or not was irrelevant. 
 In order to fully understand and categorise the African scholars on democracy we have to 
go with Dickson Eyo’s categorisation 
 He categorised African debate on democracy into three groups: 
The Universalist, the popular democratic and the nativist. 
Under the Universalist perspective Eyo counts Peter Anyang nyong’o and Jibrin Ibrahim 
as the leading proponents.80 These two regard multipartyism as the pillar of democracy 
              Universalists root for the liberal democratic model which is characterised by 
regular elections held under different political parties and the elections must be held 
under a free and fair environment.81 Nyong’o notes that the collapse of the African state 
is to be blamed on the lack of transparency and accountability that is the hallmark of 
African leadership. He cites the failure of African states to implement socio-economic 
policies that can improve the livelihoods of the poor majority as one of the reasons why 
the continent is in dire need of multi-partyism.82 As an instrumentalist and 
developmentalist, Nyong’o sees democracy as an instrument of development and it’s 
precisely this assertion that put him at loggerheads with Mkandawire who presented his 
democracy as an absolute value and doesn’t see the need to justify democracy in terms of 
development.83 
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           Anyang’ Nyong’o faults the records of autocrats during the single party era and 
blames them for the current underdevelopment on the continent. He singles them out as 
being solely responsible for Africa’s sorry economic state. He blames the military and 
civilian elite that possessed power in the 80s as having used it as an instrument of 
personal enrichment, this they did at the expense of the majority poor. This is also the 
period associated with chronic corruption which further helped erode the little legitimacy 
that had been left in most African regimes.84 Nyong’o supports liberal democracy but his 
worry is that African dictators have been able to distort its meaning such that it leaves 
one man standing in the ring as an ideology of potentially universal validity. This is a 
view he shares with Fukuyama Francis who castigates the mode of democracy being 
exercised in Africa as an exercise in legitimising the leadership of the big man. For 
Africa to take off, Nyongo proposes that it must be part and parcel of liberal democracy.85 
The way individual freedoms have been curtailed convinces Nyongo that Africa is not 
really liberal. 
           Nyongo also observes that the period just after independence was the best for the 
continent in terms of economic development.  He singles out sectors such as education, 
health and the general standards of living as having had a strong growth rate. 
Employment was also an area that grew rapidly which he gives credit to the 
indigenization policies.86 Abbink disagrees with these assertions and lays the blame at the 
democrats’ door. He blames them for raising people’s expectations only to crush them a 
little while later. People soon discovered that the democracy they had been shouting for is 
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not what they were getting. Dictators learnt fast and embraced multiparty elections to 
serve as rituals to divide and rule and stay in power.87 Democracy was warmly received 
but soon turned out the way Schumpeter had aptly described it ‘as a means for the elite to 
fight for peoples vote in order to use it to dominate them’.88 They also put prominence on 
the universality of individual rights. This group’s obsession with individual and the 
individual rights is what Ake calls the atomisation of the society and is in direct conflict 
with the cultural realities on the continent.89 By prescribing a model that has worked in 
the West they are overlooking the fact that in the West nations have already achieved the 
task of looking after collective rights and that’s why the focus has now shifted to 
individual rights. Africa does not boast of strong states with strong institutions and any 
attempt at atomisation might shake the bond experienced in our families and 
communities.  
            When it comes to external help in the push for democracy, Nyong’o and Ibrahim 
differ. Where as Nyong’o endorses political conditions for external aid, Ibrahim 
dismisses it and blames it for denying African governments the opportunity to make 
independent decisions.90 The stand taken by Nyong’o can be attributed to the fact that he 
was one of the people who tried to make the Kenyan autocratic government adopt multi-
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partyism in vain; the last option was to rely on external support which was successful.91 
Other scholars such as Barry Gills and Joel Rocamora take a dim view in relation to the 
external support for democratisation; they are very pessimistic about the chances of 
liberal democracy taking root on the African continent courtesy of donor pressure.92 To 
them, the current efforts aimed at democratisation are just an integral aspect of the 
economic and ideological restructuring accompanying a new stage of globalisation in the 
capitalist world economy. They add that the word ‘democracy’ is in danger of political 
mystification or obfuscation, serving as euphemism for sophisticated modern forms of 
neo-authoritarians.93 In this regard democracy is among the many ways the west has 
devised to facilitate easy trade which unfortunately leaves the African continent poorer. 
Ndegwa acknowledges that external pressure particularly from donors especially western 
nations, the World Bank and the IMF might have given impetus for the reform struggle 
but warns that the dependence of state on external actors, especially in terms of 
adjustment, budget and development policy clearly undermines the legitimacy of the 
state.94 But Hameso blames the over reliance on donors for political change to the 
incapacity and vulnerability of political actors, both the ones in the opposition and the 
ones in power.95 He says that they have limited choice in terms of fresh proposals to the 
economic policy changes and that since the current strategic policies are already 
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determined outside Africa by the International Financial institutions without the consent 
of the people, the competition among parties will only be on the basis of which group 
executes the predetermined policies better and this clearly hinders the growth of 
democracy on the continent.96 
              When it comes to popular democratic perspective, Eyo identifies Issa Shivji and 
Mahmood mamdani as the major proponents.97 These two object to the truncated version 
of democracy which they refer to as multipartyism. Their critiques emanate from the 
distinction between the socioeconomic versus individual rights and the historicity of 
liberal democracy as a class-based system of rule that emerged with and is geared toward 
the reproduction of capitalism in the west.98  This group is critical of domestic elite who 
use multi-partyism to stay in power and this has resulted in a bloody circulation of these 
elites in what Shivji refers to as compradorial democracy.99 Their fears were not 
unfounded since experience in countries such as Kenya and Zambia has shown that a 
formal declaration of all the prerequisites for western democracy does not necessarily 
realise liberal democracy. 
 According to Shivji, democracy is the question of the struggles of the popular 
classes.100 Development, accountability, parties elections are but the symptomatic forms 
of the existence of or moment in the struggle. Shivji thinks that the position taken by the 
Universalists avoids historical context and social forces. He was also of the opinion that 
the likes of Nyong’o and Jibrin were being influenced by ‘fashionable bandwagons’ of 
the west. He accused them of indulging in unabashed celebration of liberalism. He 
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submits that the centrality of democracy in the present historical context lies precisely in 
the fact that it expresses or constitutes an ideology of resistance and struggle of the large 
masses and popular classes of the people and that at the minimum it has to be an ideology 
which articulates anti-imperialism and anti-comprador-state positions. He dismisses 
liberal democracy as an ideology of domination.101  
One of the tenets of democracy which is multiparty elections has increasingly 
come under sharp criticism from a number of scholars, is multi-party elections, many 
have branded multi-party elections as a façade, Abbink credits them for enabling 
autocratic leaders to remain in office by tactfully using the electoral procedures to divide 
and rule their countries102. Hameso captures this clearly when he says that one obvious 
outcome of sudden introduction of political competition is the manipulation of the polity 
by the incumbent and the opportunists who take advantage of the loopholes in the ‘rules 
of the game’ for the purpose of self aggrandizement and not for the benefit of societies103. 
 In much of Africa the story is that of conducting problematic elections without 
initiating substantive changes to the leadership or the polity. When changes seem 
imminent, political protagonists refuse to accept the outcome as fair. This cannot be 
further from the truth as recent events in some once stable countries like Kenya and 
Zimbabwe have shown that incumbents are ready to change the rules of the game in order 
to remain in power.  
Africa is now moving into an era of negotiated settlements and there are fears that 
leaders like Museveni might be getting a few useful tips which they will later use to stay 
in power. In an interview with Rukare, the above fears were confirmed as he sees a 
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situation where if the incumbent loses in the next election then the incoming leader must 
find a way to accommodate him, possibly a power sharing arrangement that totally 
defeats the whole purpose of democratic elections.104 They also reckon that patronage 
politics and clientilism will persist although the base will widen because of multi-
partyism. To them, political and socio-economic rights ought to be pursued together to 
attain emancipatory democracy. Just like Ake, they stress attention to the rights of 
communities rather than the individual.105 
  The other perspective is the nativist one with Ake as the main proponent. He 
terms the African society as being pre-industrial and communal and whose cultural idiom 
is radically different from the western one.106 He also sees the economies as being 
informal and highly subsistence which does not bode well for democracy. Ake also thinks 
that the close association between liberal democracy and capitalism makes it unsuitable 
for Africa; he observes that Africans are highly communal unlike their Western 
counterparts whom he finds to be very individualistic. According to him this is the 
foundation upon which democracy is build. In democracy people demand individual 
political rights which he thinks is not important at the moment, instead he prefers that 
economic issues be taken care of first before the political rights are looked at.107 
Ake was of the view that some African leaders were only using democracy as a strategy 
for power and not a means of empowering people.  
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Efforts by the international community to promote democracy are also faulted for 
not taking people’s interests at heart but rather for pushing for an environment that would 
enable easy trade, these are some of the concerns that Ake had when he advocated for a 
customised democracy that emphasises concrete economic rights instead of political 
rights that are he hallmark of liberal democracy.108  The failure by the newly democratic 
African states to improve the lot of its people casts serious doubts on the viability of 
liberal democracy on the continent and also the fact that ethnic conflicts, which 
democracy had hoped to eliminate intensified rather than subsided is a big blow to the 
democratisation efforts on the continent.  
Buijtenhujss and Thiriet singles out Okamba and Adedeji Adebayo as some of the 
writers who just like Ake do not think multipartyism is conducive to the management and 
organisation of political power in Africa. Adedeji argues that the democratisation in 
Africa will be sustainable and credible only if it comes as an integral part of the 
transformation of the political and socio-economic structures109. This debate is also 
joined by Skinner who declares that liberal democracy can only take root if the society is 
industrially, economically and socially advanced, a view also shared by Hameso who 
rejects liberal democracy on the ground that it is unsuitable for Africa’s socio-economic 
structures.110           
Lumumba Kasongo joined the democracy debate later by dismissing the political 
system adopted by most African countries as a fragment of liberal democracy known as 
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multipartyism.111 Just like Ake and other nativists Lumumba also thinks that it is difficult 
for representative democracy to succeed in the current African social and economic 
conditions. He cites the lack of access to resources which can promote active 
participation in the political process and belief in the political system as one of the 
reasons why representative democracy is difficult to implement on the continent.112 He 
advises Africans to firmly check the system of checks and balances which would limit the 
chances of personalisation and individualisation of power, corruption, military ambition, 
political charlatanism and opportunistic politics. He is of the view that African 
democracies should be guided by principles of cultural diversity, social equality and 
equitable access to resources. It is only through a strong social state that alternative 
democratic practices can be fully articulated.113 
 Just like Ake and others who have little time for liberal democracy, Lumumba 
also thinks that representative democracy cannot flourish in Africa due to the current 
social and economic conditions. He advises that for liberal democracy to succeed then 
access to basic resources is needed to promote active participation.114 This view is not 
restricted to African scholars alone as Lipset and Cutright also argued that variations in 
degrees of democracy can largely be explained by differences in socio-economic 
development, thus Africa might not be ready for liberal democracy until high socio-
economic levels are attained.115 
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The main difference between nativists and popular democracy approaches lies in 
the nativist conviction that rural societies remain the repositories of democratic values 
from which to build culturally germane, participatory forms of democracy at the nation 
state level. Nativists depart from the view that the post colonial state is an alien system of 
rule designed to serve the interests of small groups of Westernised elites.116 
Both are in agreement when it comes to atomisation of society, they think that African 
social realities which is defined by communal is not ready for this.117  But Okoth Ogendo 
weighed in on the issue of individual rights by offering a solution that proposed for the 
adoption of the classical concept of individual rights by Africans but modify it to 
incorporate certain group rights and obligations in what he terms as “people’s rights.”118 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3.1 History of Ugandan Politics 
Introduction 
One cannot fully dissect the complex relationship between Uganda and donors 
without revisiting the country’s past which has been littered by dictatorships, misrule and 
unprecedented economic rundown. One needs to closely look at the past rulers, the 
colonial legacy that bred ethnic tensions, the military, legislative work over the years then 
finally take a closer look at Museveni and his brand of politics which has effectively 
lumped him together with African autocrats. The focus will then shift to the movement 
system to understand why this political system has been instrumental in shaping the 
regime’s relationship with donors and local political players. 
 
3.1.1 Historical Background 
             Uganda was colonised by the British with the rule being formalised by the 1890 
Buganda treaty. A protectorate was declared in 1894.119 Just like other African colonies, 
the Uganda borders were drawn with total disregard to ethnic composition of the country. 
The result of this has been the simmering tension between the Nilotic-speaking 
northerners like the Acholi and Langi and the Bantu speaking Southerners like the 
Baganda. Buganda was accorded a privileged status by the British following the signing 
of the 1900 agreement, this agreement is said to be largely responsible for disunity of the 
country in the 1950’s when Buganda vehemently refused to legislative reforms that 
would have seen more black representation in the legislative assembly, just like other 
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British colonies, Uganda was also ruled indirectly with the colonial masters using 
compliant Baganda rulers to further conquer and administer other Uganda kingdoms120. 
Unlike other tribes, the Baganda were favoured by the British in terms of 
development and leadership. The Northern parts of Uganda were overlooked by the 
British, who only exploited them for cheap labour121, this labour was then utilised in the 
more fertile Southern side of the country where cash crops were grown. This area was 
later to boast the best infrastructure in the country, with the North and West being left out 
of any development plans. Since those early days tensions have persisted between the 
developed parts of the country and the Northern parts which still lag behind in terms of 
development, this has spilled over to the army which tends to be split between different 
factions based on ethnicity.122 
The British fearing that they might be entrenching Buganda, adopted a policy 
whereby they recruited only the northerners to the army. This helped to neutralise an 
already powerful Buganda but was later to prove a big problem since by the time the 
country was getting independence the army was highly skewed in favour of the 
Northerners especially the Acholi and Teso.123 Mamdani attributes the recruitment of 
Northerners to the army to the need to maintain order in the cash crop growing areas in 
the South.124 
The first government of Obote inherited this policy and continued staffing the 
military with the Northerners, a situation that Museveni tried to rectify as soon as took 
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over power. The Acholi, Langi and Teso were favoured by the British for the army role 
because they were perceived to be more martial, a labelled that stuck even after 
independence.125 The Southern part was primarily used for agriculture where the British 
grew cash crops, this was because the Southern parts of the country were more fertile but 
labour was still sourced from the Northern communities, the result was a lopsided 
development that favoured the South.126 
The British relationship with Buganda was a special one which led to the signing 
of the 1900 agreement that set Buganda apart from the rest of Uganda. The Kabaka and 
his chiefs were conferred special privileges in return for their cooperation.127 
 This was later played out in the period leading to independence since the Kabaka was 
keen to protect his privileges at the expense of forging a unified nation. He refused to 
work with others to form a single unifying party that would be used to unite Ugandans at 
independence like was the case in Kenya under KANU and Tanzania under TANU. 
In the end the Buganda kingdom was to be retained but the rest of the country was to 
unite. Other tribes such as Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro were allowed to retain their semi-
autonomous status.128 
Despite retaining his Kingdom, the Buganda king ended up being the first 
president of the republic which brought more confusion considering that the rest of 
Uganda was not a monarchy.129 This arrangement involved building a coalition with the 
Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) held for four years before finally crumbling, this is 
usually blamed on the independence constitution that did not authoritatively deal with 
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issues such as the autonomy of Buganda and the role of the King in the unitary 
government.130 
       The independence government consisted of a fragile coalition between Uganda 
People’s Congress of Milton Obote and the Kabaka Yekka Party. Under this arrangement 
Obote became the first Prime Minister of Uganda while Kabaka assumed largely a 
ceremonial presidency, this he did despite holding on to his Buganda kingdom.131 
 The coalition only lasted for a year due to disagreements over counties that had been 
annexed by the British from Bunyoro and given to Buganda. This led to a referendum 
which helped give back some of the territory to Bunyoro.132 
The King refused to give assent to the referendum legislation which led to the political 
upheavals that eventually resulted in the disintegration of the coalition in 1966. The 1962 
constitution was suspended due to its unworkability especially when it came to the issue 
of Buganda autonomy and the lost counties133. It was then replaced by an interim 
government. This happened after Obote faced opposition from his own UPC party and it 
resulted in promotion of Amin to the position of army commander and dethronement of 
Kabaka from the presidency. 
The years that followed saw Obote try to consolidate his power by introducing a 
new constitution in 1967 which abolished the four kingdoms and further strengthened 
executive powers. Following the assassination attempt on Obote in 1969, the UPC 
banned all opposition groups and effectively created a one party state134.However 
Obote’s reign was rudely interrupted by Iddi Amin who capitalised on the disunity in the 
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army and the tensions that had developed between him and Obote to seize power in early 
1971. This was carried out while Obote was away on an official trip in Singapore.135 
At first many Ugandans welcomed the new developments unaware of what 
awaited them, soon their jubilations proved to be short-lived as Amin turned against 
them. The first to face Amin’s wrath were the Langi and Acholi soldiers who were 
systematically eliminated. Many Ugandans had to flee for fear of being killed but many 
more others were brutally slain by the government forces.136Asian businesses were next 
to be targeted as Amin expelled Asians from Uganda. Rachel Flanary and David Watt 
attribute this expulsion to the decay in Uganda’s once prosperous economy.137 The 
ejection of Asian businessmen, who were the mainstay of business and mercantile life led 
to a serious erosion of skills and technical know-how that was badly needed in Uganda138. 
Amin proceeded to dish out some of those businesses to his cronies who had no business 
skills thus plunging the country into an economic meltdown, soon corruption became a 
way of life. Amin relied on force and before long he suspended political activity and most 
civil rights. The national Assembly was dissolved leaving Amin to rule Uganda by 
Capricious decree.139 Finally Tanzanian forces ended his adventures by toppling him after 
he attempted to annexe part of Tanzania.140 This created the way for Obote’s comeback. 
Yusuf Lules Uganda’s National Liberation Army (UNLA) held power for a full 
two months before collapsing.141 Godfrey Binaisa, a former attorney General replaced 
Lule but political squabbles within UNLA made it difficult for Binaisa to unite a fractious 
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Ugandan society. In 1979 he banned party polities to try and heal the divisions in the 
country but he was ousted by an Obote leaning military faction in the army.142 In 
December 1980 general elections were held which Obote’s UPC won although critics 
claim that the election was not free and fair therefore denying the Democratic Party 
victory.143 Museveni’s Uganda Patriotic Movement also took part in the elections but 
performed dismally with even Museveni himself failing to win his home seat of Mbarara. 
After the elections Museveni went straight to the bush to start a 5 yr war under the 
banner of National Resistance Army. The aim was to defeat the government and institute 
some key changes in the country’s system of governance. Museveni argued that his call 
for arms was a legitimate response to undemocratic practices. From early on Museveni 
fought on the ideology of bringing democracy to Uganda and heal the country from the 
deep divisions it had plunged into.144The war had a big toll on human life with the 
government responsible for some of the killings especially in Buganda near Kampala. 
Analysts estimate that the Obote-Museveni war claimed more lives than the Amin reign 
with the Luwero triangle gaining notoriety as the epicentre of the killings. 
NRA had a strong following in places like Buganda due to the region’s perceived 
persecution by the first Obote government.145 In 1985 Obote was again deposed by Tito 
Okello. This coup was as a result of factional struggles within the army, the Acholi 
faction accused the Langi of enjoying the fruits of power while turning the Acholi into 
cannon fodder to fight the fast expanding guerrilla army in the Luwero triangle.146  
In January 1986 Museveni and NRA took over Kampala. 
                                               
142 Loc Cit. 
143 Ibid p.34 
144 Loc Cit. 
145 Loc Cit. 
146 Mamdani, M, Op Cit. 
 57
 
3.1.2 Uganda under Museveni 
Museveni’s first major act on taking power was to ban political party activity 
during the transition period that was initially not supposed to last for more than four 
years. This he did in his first year in office. In the beginning all political players were 
happy with the arrangement since they believed Museveni was being sincere and would 
stay true to his word.147  Museveni made it known that his government was interim, its 
job was to restore peace, rebuild the police, reform the civil service, judiciary and rule the 
country on the basis of unity.148 Indeed he adopted the ten-point program developed 
during the bush war which among other things was designed to establish popular 
democracy, restore security, consolidate national unity, defend national independence, 
build a national economy, rehabilitate and resettle displaced people, ensure regional 
cooperation and human rights and finally to follow a strategy of mixed economy.149 To 
his credit, Museveni has overseen a steady economic growth and brought democracy to 
the village level; however at the national level democracy has been stifled by the 
movement system which doesn’t encourage any form of dissent.  
The No-party system through the Resistance councils has opened democratic 
space at the local level enabling ordinary Ugandans to take part in day to day affairs that 
govern their lives but when one looks at the national level the picture is different, the 
show is run by one man and those who have differing opinion are rendered politically 
impotent by the unfavourable political system. Foreign journalists stationed in Uganda at 
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that time made the new regime known to the world and ensured that the Museveni 
presidency was perceived favourably.150 
However, Museveni will forever be remembered for his distaste of multiparty 
politics. His preferred political system has been the movement or no-party system which 
he fronted as an alternative to multipartyism. This would not have been possible without 
the backing of the donors. From the moment he assumed power, Museveni devised clever 
means to stay on unchallenged often giving convincing reasons for doing so. From 1986 
to 1989 was declared an interim period whereby all political parties would come together 
under the Umbrella of National Resistance Movement. 
After the completion of the interim period in 1989, Museveni further extended the 
interim period for another 5 years using the violence in the country as an excuse.151 
From 1989 to 1994 Museveni resorted to strong arms tactics while dealing with 
opponents of his regime, those who attempted to hold rallies were threatened. In 1995 the 
country adopted a new constitution that completely suffocated other political parties by 
entrenching the movement system.152 Elections were held in 1996 under the new 
constitution which stipulated that a president cannot serve more than two terms in office. 
Museveni defeated Democratic Party’s Paul Ssemogerere. Five years later Museveni 
faced-off with a one time political ally, Kiiza Besigye whom Museveni comfortably 
trounced by a wide margin of 40% but by this time Museveni was already campaigning to 
have term limits removed from the constitution153, a feat he achieved without much of a 
fight in 2005, just in time to stand for the infamous third term. 
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3.1.3 Quest for third terms in Africa 
The early 90’s saw multi-party politics return to the majority of African countries 
but in some of these states, such as Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Namibia, as the 
incumbent president’s terms of office came to an end they begun to manoeuvre for 
extension.154 Later others like Kenya and Nigeria also tried to toy with the idea but the 
mood on the surface in their respective countries made them abandon bids for term 
extensions. Obasanjo went ahead and tried to amend the constitution but the senate 
rejected the amendment. Some resorted to sponsoring lame duck candidates with the hope 
of continuing to call the shots while in retirement but this too has not worked. Good 
example is Kenya where Moi’s candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta was defeated in general 
elections and Obasanjo’s pick, Yar’Adua has not been keen to carry on with some of his 
predecessors’ policies  
Anthony Okuku draws parallels between Uganda and Zimbabwe where a 
referendum was held in February 2000 to determine whether the country should adopt a 
new democratic constitution. Zimbabwe’s voters rejected the proposed new constitution 
by 55% to 45%. The Zambian and Malawian third term bids were also defeated.155 
In the case of Uganda, Museveni used all political tricks in the book to get the 322 
member parliament lift the presidential term limit. Andrew Mwenda takes issue with 
Ugandan legislators whom he says were bribed, blackmailed and intimidated by 
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Museveni’s lieutenants.156 In the end the constitutional amendment sailed through 
parliament opening the doors for the president to run as many times as he wishes. 
Mwenda reckons that with the nature of African politics where the opposition is usually 
rendered impotent by the ruling party, this was tantamount to creation of a presidential 
monarchy since he doesn’t think the opposition will uproot Museveni.157 
Museveni being a crafty politician had already set in motion mechanisms to see 
him retain power upon the completion of his constitutionally allowed term. Okuku traces 
this to the October 2000 split in the ruling movement. Besigye, a former close ally of 
Museveni broke ranks and challenged the president in the 2001 March elections. In 
response to Besigye’s challenge, Museveni appointed the Constitutional Review 
Commission (CRC) to review provisions in the 1995 constitution which led to the 2005 
amendment. The argument used was that term limits are undemocratic as they deny the 
people a chance to choose whoever they want.158 
 
3.1.4 Legislation during Museveni’s reign 
The Odoki Commission, named after its chairperson, was constituted in March 
1989 to draw up a new constitution for the country. Many argued that the commission’s 
make-up was strongly in favour of NRM. The commission was appointed by the 
government apparently without due and proper consultations. The commission was made 
up of 21 members with most commissioners being regarded as avid sympathisers of the 
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NRM.159 The commission’s work coincided with a ban on political party activities which 
limited the participation of those outside the NRM circles. 
  The commission did well and gained public confidence by allaying fears that it 
was only rubber stamping the NRM positions. However the final product was widely 
perceived to be an elitist one that did not reflect the views of the people.160 After 
successfully gathering views from every corner of the country, the final report 
recommended that the one party system be done away with but Ugandans be given a say 
to choose what they want through a referendum. 
The 1993 Constituent Assembly elections necessitated the enactment of an Act 
which the NRM government fully exploited to convert the original ban on political party 
activities into a legal one. Candidates were banned from standing on political party 
tickets and those that went against this faced disqualification. Political rallies had to 
receive a nod from the government.161 
  Constituent Assembly elections were held in 1994 with all major parties taking 
part where a number of opposition politicians won. By this time the issue about the type 
of political system to be adopted remained sticky, some were of the view that the Odoki 
commission might have been overtaken by time and people were ready for multipartyism. 
Some elements within the LRA high command were critical of the stance taken by NRA 
to extend the interim government by another five years. These were Major General David 
Tingefuza and Serwanga Lwanga, both high ranking NRA officials.162 Ultimately the 
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constituent assembly adopted a constitution in September 1995 which placed severe 
restrictions on political party activity163.  
 
3.1.5 The No-Party/ Movement System 
  According to Museveni, the movement system was the best prescription for 
healing the divisions caused by former administrations. Under the movement system 
individuals were barred from running on any political party ticket. Though it restricted 
party politics, democracy at the local level was encouraged. Originally the movement was 
meant to be an interim measure for reconstruction but soon but soon became rationalised 
as the preferred mode of political system.164 The system was designed along resistance 
councils which had a five tier system that ensured penetration to the village level. The 
Odoki commission described the movement system to be very democratic and a vehicle 
through which all Ugandans could participate through the expansive resistance 
councils.165 
Praise was heaped on the system for its perceived role in the steady economic 
growth of the country besides also bringing relative calm to the once very volatile 
country. Museveni also cited the poverty and lack of a clearly defined class structure in 
Africa as the reason why an attempt at democracy would fail. He also cautioned that 
politicians would take advantage of voter’s ignorance and try and divide them along 
ethnic and religious lines. He warned that political parties were going to undo what he 
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had done for the Ugandans and return the country into anarchy.166 These sentiments were 
shared by most Ugandans who still had fresh memories of the past brutal regimes of both 
Obote and Amin. His campaign was crafted on fear and he successfully capitalised on 
Ugandan’s fresh memories of the past atrocities to drive the message home. In the end the 
NRM managed to have Ugandans of all walks belonging to it and anyone who dared 
oppose the movement was easily labelled as a sectarian.167  
However, the Movement was to later morph into what Barkan refers to as an ‘old-
style’ one party state reminiscent of Africa during the 80’s. Some members of the 
movement became more loyal to Museveni and the movement than others and were 
regarded as being ‘more movement’ than others.168 In 2005 the movement evolved into 
the National Resistance Movement Organisation effectively becoming a political party on 
whose ticket Museveni stood for a third term in 2006 and won. 
Fighting in the North by the LRA has however taken away some of the shine on 
Museveni’s assertions that the movement was a cure for sectarianism. Some claim that 
the movement has further alienated the Northern part of the country, one of the reasons 
why the war in the North would not end fast.169 Under the no-party system we have local 
councils that were crucial for the management of political affairs of the country. 
The Resistance Council idea was conceived and first implemented when Museveni 
was still in the bush. He put areas he captured under the RC’s but the idea was later 
spread to the whole country when the NRA/M captured power170. The RC’s start at the 
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village level (LC1) and progress through the parish (LC2) to the sub-county (LC3), 
county (LC4) and district (LC5). During the 1996 elections all those that wanted 
positions in RC faced the electorate except for a few seats which were reserved for 
interest groups including the army.171 Many agree that the local councils provided 
citizens with a chance to participate fully in local affairs which was not the case at the 
national level. The village level was more democratic and participatory unlike the 
national level which remained largely undemocratic. However, the Local Council system 
did not escape criticism; some people accused it of serving interests of the movement 
especially in the 1996 elections. Council officials were accused of harassing those that 
were opposed to the movement system.172   
 
The next chapter will give us insights on how this political system benefitted from 
the rampant corruption which has been made possible by budget support. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4.1 Budget support, corruption and regime maintenance in Uganda 
 
  This chapter will analyse the interplay between donor aid, corruption and the 
effect this has on democracy. The focus will largely be on budget support which has of 
late gained favour with the donors as the preferred mode of giving aid and will seek to 
find out how certain characteristics of budget support makes it ideal for corruption to 
thrive. 
Reasons why the continent receives aid varies from author to author, while some 
like Omatayo attribute this to the need to fast-track Africa’s stagnant economy, others 
like Orjiako cite the colonial ties as a strong reason why a particular European power 
would feel obliged to lend to an African country. However, the author who has come 
closest to pinpointing why Uganda receives aid is Caroline Lancaster, she does not 
explicitly mention the country but by singling out promotion of democracy, promotion of 
economic development and advancing security concerns, gaining commercial advantages 
and achieving cultural goals she manages to give us a framework that can be used to 
describe Uganda’s case. 
Uganda’s strategic location in the volatile Great Lakes region combined with 
Kenya’s waning credibility173 puts it in the pole position as far as receiving freebies is 
concerned. A good example is the budget support that goes into funding military budget; 
every other year the country manages to convince the donors to adjust this budget 
upwards because of the situation in the region and the country itself. Fighting The Lords 
Resistance Army has been used a number of times to solicit more military funding. 
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  Museveni’s famed economic reforms on taking over from the earlier dictators 
have given him a great mileage especially when it comes to soliciting for budget support 
which he easily gets due to the relative prudence in fiscal management compared to 
earlier regimes. The regime is also plundering the local resources as it tactfully presents 
clean books where development aid from donors is concerned. 
 
4.2 Budget support to Uganda 
  As mentioned earlier, Uganda qualifies for budget support because of the 
president’s economic reforms that included privatisation, civil service restructuring and 
general economic reforms that greatly pleased the donors. According to Michael Atingi 
of the Bank of Uganda, budget support that finances nearly half of the country’s 
expenditures has been possible due to the country’s commitment to the reforms and 
macroeconomic stability which have given confidence to the donors.174 
Programs such as the 3 year Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility with IMF and the 
second Structural Adjustment Credit from World Bank which were both carried out in 
1994, then followed by the Enhanced Structural Facility of 1997 and the approval of a 
third Structural Adjustment Credit by the World Bank are credited for the restoration of 
macroeconomic stability that resulted in the growth of the economy by up to 10% in 
1994-1995.175 However, Rukare supported Atingi’s claims but added that the government 
has not always been transparent in its dealings judging from the annual reports released 
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by the Auditor General.176 The assumption made when giving budget support is that the 
recipient country will be as transparent as possible to avoid undesirable results like what 
is being witnessed in the country today.  
Before the turn of the Millennium, budget support flows were less than US$200 
Million a year, or about 3 % of the country’s GDP but from the year 2000 it doubled to 
6% of the GDP peaking at 8% in 2001.177 Budget support accounts for about 60% of total 
aid recipients. Of this the bilateral budget support makes up to 60% of total budget 
support. The major bilateral donors include the United Kingdom which is the largest 
donor and accounts for over 40% of total bilateral budget support, Ireland, Denmark, 
Japan, Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Austria and the USA make up the other 
donors.178 The World Bank has consistently been the largest multilateral donor peaking at 
US$225 Million in 2001 which represented more than 50% of total budget support for 
that year.179 
 Budget support creates ideal conditions for corruption especially if the recipient 
country is not honest in its dealings. Uganda’s budget for sectors such as defence is 
debated then presented to the donors for approval but when the country includes in its 
payroll a list of ghost soldiers as we shall find out in the next section then budget support 
becomes another great avenue to enrich the ruling elite. By actually supplementing the 
national budget to up to 50% the donors also dampen local revenue collection as 
observed by Rukare. The government relaxes in its tax collection and under such 
circumstances some favoured businessmen start receiving tax reprieves from the 
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government, Rukare says that this is what happened in the neighbouring Kenya whereby 
some Asian businessmen were exempted from taxation and it’s the same business people 
that later contributed millions of dollars for the incumbent’s re-election.180 Some 
fundraising events were organised in the Kenyan capital including the infamous 1 Million 
per plate dinners with the proceedings funding the campaign machinery of the ruling 
party’s candidate.181 The strong government and first family connection that most 
prominent businessmen enjoy in Uganda raises a real possibility that they might be 
enjoying tax reprieves and the government is not feeling the pain due to steady and 
predictable flows of aid from donors. 
 
4.3 Corruption and regime maintenance in Uganda 
  According to research carried out by Alesina and Wader, more corrupt countries 
are the ones that receive more aid.182 There is no better portrayal of this than goings on in 
Uganda. As mentioned earlier in this study, the country holds position 126 out of 180 on 
the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) released by Transparency International in 2008. 
Corruption has emerged as a formidable threat to Uganda’s political and economic 
stability. The symptoms are hard to spot partly because of Uganda’s turbulent past that 
usually dwarfs current problems but with political and the business climate becoming 
more competitive, there are real fears that Museveni might be using the massive 
patronage system he has built over the years to try and win a fourth term dealing a 
devastating blow to democratisation efforts. The period leading to 2006 elections 
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witnessed unprecedented corruption scandals which observers linked to Museveni’s  fight 
for a third term, in order to get a shot at another term in office he first needed to amend 
the constitution which barred him from running for another term. 
The country is still in good books with donors meaning that budgetary needs are 
usually taken care of especially the development budget thus opening avenues for grand 
graft. There have been well documented cases of graft involving people close to the 
president including his own brother, Salim Saleh. With sights set on a fourth term, the 
scandals have started increasing both in frequency and magnitude, recently two high 
ranking cabinet members, Amama Mbabazi and Sam Kutesa who occupy Security and 
Foreign Affairs ministries respectively were mentioned in corruption scandals that had 
some Members of Parliament claiming that the money was to be used to target non-
compliant members. 
Crony capitalism started taking shape in the 90’s but intensified in the lead up to 
the 2001 general election. The first eye-catching scandal was the privatisation of the state 
owned Dairy Corporation to a Thai investor for 1$183. It’s understood that $15 million 
meant for Universal Primary Education School feeding programme was being diverted in 
this scam. Some members of parliament were furious with this since it was clear that 
someone high up in government was lining up his pockets from this deal. Assumption 
was that Museveni was a beneficiary because of the urgent need to fund elections. This 
particular case is important as it also highlights the potential avenues for corruption 
created by the World Bank’s conditionality of privatisation. Later that year members of 
parliament were bribed with $2800 each to pass a motion in favour of the extension of the 
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presidential term limit184. The current constitution allows the president to run as many 
times as he wants.    Election campaigns have become a very costly affair making 
Parliamentarians susceptible to bribery especially when an election is just around the 
corner. Museveni and his men baited Parliamentarians with bagfuls of goodies towards 
the last general election first to ensure that the clause barring him from running was 
removed and secondly to ensure his re-election in actual polls. 
Barkan believes that Museveni’s regime is propped by a small group of people 
who have grown very rich from corrupt dealings and will do anything to ensure that the 
status quo remains in order to avoid prosecution under a different regime. These people 
have not only enriched themselves but also provide a flow of income and patronage that 
sustain the regime.185 Names that come to mind include Museveni’s brother, Salim Saleh, 
a retired army Lt. General who has a string of business interests that specialise in 
procurements for various government ministries including the defence. Good example is 
Caleb International, a firm associated with Caleb and other members of the first family 
including Museveni’s son that used to procure equipment for the military186.   
In 2001 the government sold the Uganda Commercial Bank to a Malaysian firm 
whereby the government is believed to have been swindled colossal sums of money. The 
government is said to have lost up to $5 million187. With such large sums of money being 
misappropriated towards Museveni’s ‘last’ days in office observers started questioning 
his political intentions, surely the war chest for an extended stay in office was being built. 
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The government loses such amounts but it does not really feel the pain since donors will 
step in and ensure the books balance. 
More recently national security minister Amama Mbabazi, a close ally of 
Museveni with ties stretching back to the bush war days has been embroiled in a 
corruption scandal involving the sale of land belonging to the National Social Security 
Fund, a government body charged with safeguarding workers retirement benefits. 
Mbabazi faced censure from the house and some members of the cabinet but the 
President intervened and was able to rally the cabinet to Mbabazi’s defence188. The NRM 
dominated parliament was prevailed upon to clear him and on 6th November 2008 he was 
cleared although it was clear that he was guilty for using his vast influence to have his 
land sold to the statutory body at an inflated price. 
  Some Members such as the Kibaale MP Frank Tumwebaze are on record as 
having said that Mbabazi intents to use the cash to sponsor NRM compliant Members 
against them (rebels) in the 2011 general elections, he in particular cited a Mr Godfrey 
Mutabazi, a Mbabazi ally and an NRM insider as being lined up to take him on in the 
coming general elections189. Apart from holding the crucial Security docket, he is also the 
party’s secretary general, a position that enables him to use his vast corruptly acquired 
wealth to ensure Museveni’s regime endures. He does this by sponsoring compliant 
candidates against reform minded candidates to ensure that the Museveni regime 
survives; he is hardly censured by the president when he engages in corruption. 
  In the 90’s Mbabazi was also in the news for his links to the Luwero Industries, a 
government owned firm that produces ammunition for the Uganda’s People’s Defence 
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Forces whose managing director was Jackie his wife190. At that time Mbabazi was the 
Defence Minister, this was not surprising considering that the defence usually gets the 
lion’s share of the annual budget and it is common for the defence ministry to embezzle 
funds knowing very well that the donors will always ensure that the ministry is well 
nourished. The never ending war with the Lords Resistance Army in the North has been 
used time and again as a reason for increasing the budget of the defence ministry and 
donors, fearing that LRA might collude with terrorists do not hesitate to pump more 
money into the ministry. Some observers believe that the figures being produced to be 
used in that particular war are highly inflated. The defence ministry is therefore a reliable 
cash-cow for the regime hence the reason to put it under Museveni’s close allies. 
Another of Museveni’s close ally, powerful Foreign Affairs Minister Sam 
Kahamba Kutesa is currently under investigation by the Public Accounts Committee for 
alleged influence peddling, conflict of interest and abuse of office. It is alleged that he 
used his law firm to swindle public funds, he used his position as a minister of foreign 
affairs to negotiate and authorise a disputed payment of $750,000 to a London law firm 
Hunton & William that was contracted to project a good image of the country ahead of 
the 2007 Chogm, and the actual cost was $488,592.33. 191Kutesa was also instrumental in 
the 90’s scandals when the Movement was starting to feel the heat from Anti-
movementists. He was censured by the 6th Parliament for alleged conflict of interest by 
owning a stake in the Cargo handling Company, Entebbe Handling Services which had a 
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monopoly at Entebbe. The other shareholder was Saleh. His law firm Hunton and 
William which is headed by his daughter is still retained by the government up to now.192 
  Electioneering periods often witnesses a surge in corruption scandals apparently to 
help fund the campaigns. The last election was not different and the government 
capitalised on the World Bank backed privatisation to sale the government owned 
Uganda Telcom Ltd to a company owned by the Libyan government at a price that was 
below the market valuation. It is understood that the company was sold at 25 billion 
Ugandan Shillings to the Libya African Portfolio Greencom193. During this transaction 
there was no advertisement as it should be the norm and also there was no independent 
valuation, Finance Minister Dr Ezra Suruma was deeply involved in this194. The fact that 
this happened in an election year raised numerous eyebrows. The neighbouring Kenya 
also had a similar corrupt deal which ironically involved the same Libyan government. 
The deal involved the sale of a Hotel (Grand Regency that was once owned by a 
controversial businessman which the government later repossessed due to the 
businessman’s corruption cases). It also happened in an election year (2008) and was 
highly shrouded in secrecy but in this case the Parliamentary Accounts Committee was 
able to arm-twist the president to suspend the minister involved195. 
  Mwenda, a fierce Museveni critic attributes the elaborate patronage system put in 
place by Museveni as the main reason why he is able to extend his stay in power. This he 
has done by exploiting the avenues created by economic reform programs initiated by 
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both the state and the donors.196 Mwenda points fingers at the numerous semi-
autonomous, bodies that were built to sidestep the civil service. They include the Uganda 
Revenue Authority which is charged with collecting revenues, the Uganda Investment 
Authority, the Privatisation Unit and the Decentralisation Secretariat among others. These 
bodies have created a cash flow that the regime uses to push the National Resistance 
Movement Agenda in the country and spread the patronage web far and wide.197 Of the 
estimated $8.5 Billion in GDP, $280 Million is used to run these 95 plus semi-
autonomous government agencies.198 
  The fact that donors encouraged formation of these agencies highlights the role 
they have had in knowingly and unknowingly funding Museveni’s stay in power. 
By the time Museveni was heading into the 2006 General elections, there were 81 
Districts from the 33 that existed in 1990.199 Districts are funded by the central 
government and Museveni uses this to ensure that only NRM leaning people are at the 
helm. Almost the entire budget of the districts is footed by the central government and 
since the donors are responsible for close to half of annual budgets it goes without saying 
that they are funding Museveni’s regime. 
Another interesting observation comes from Tangri and Mwenda who asserts that 
Museveni’s apparent inaction where graft is concerned points to a tactic which has been 
perfected by African Big Men such as Moi; they turn a blind eye when senior members 
are engaged in graft in order to retain their loyalty. Any attempt to move from NRM or 
oppose Museveni is met by prosecution and confiscation of the ill-gotten wealth. 
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Ministers, senior government functionaries, senior army officers are all involved in an 
elaborate scheme that ensures they fund the NRM activities to ensure Museveni stays in 
power and they need not have anybody motivate them since they know that once their 
man gets out of power it could spell doom for them.200 
The army has proved to be a very reliable source of income for Museveni and his 
cronies; it’s no wonder that Museveni’s brother and sons have been highly visible in the 
military. There was a marked increase in the military expenditures in the late 1990’s 
which was not surprising going by the growing calls for democracy at that time. This is 
the time that the military begun acquiring more and larger military hardware mainly 
through third parties and it also marked the beginning of grand graft. Tangri observes that 
the deals at that time and indeed up to now involve bribes, kickbacks and massive 
overpayments from which army officers, top government officials and middlemen profit. 
Worst part is that the donors are the ones who finance these shoddy deals as they take 
care of most of the military budget.201 
 Operations to combat insurgents are also proving very profitable for senior 
military officers who by design are very close and loyal to the regime. These officers are 
mandated to draw up budgets and also get lucrative contracts from the field operations 
which run into Millions of dollars. Interestingly no single leader has ever been 
successfully prosecuted or punished owing to a number of factors one being the 
protection that the culprits receive from the head of state. This is not surprising since in 
the end the real beneficiary is the National Resistance Movement Party. Saleh, the 
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wayward brother to Museveni was also embroiled in another corruption scandal that 
involved the purchase of junk helicopters for the military, it is understood that he was 
bribed to the tune of $800,000 but Museveni forgave him and directed him to use the 
money in operations in the North.202 If at all the bribe money was to be used to counter 
resurgence then why was it first withdrawn from the treasury and given back as a bribe, 
money to fight resurgence could have easily been factored in the defence budget. Also to 
benefit in this deal was Museveni’s foster son Kwame Ruyondo and Emmanuel Kato, a 
prominent Kampala businessman with close ties to the first family, he is also a brother-in-
law to the chief of Defence staff of the Ugandan Army, General James Kazini.203 These 
two are believed to have pocketed similar amounts to what Saleh got. In total the 
government lost close to $8 Million in this deal, it made payments of up to $12.2 Million 
instead of $4.7 Million.204 
     Again in 1999 the defence ministry colluded with an Israel businessman to supply Jet-
fighters which turned out to be old. The government paid $50 Million which was said to 
have been highly inflated by $40 Million. During the subsequent repairs the government 
again lost large sums of money to unscrupulous army officers and businessmen related to 
the senior military officials.205 Earlier in 1995 the defence ministry had budgeted $ 12 
Million for the repair of a 1975 purchased plane, a figure which was inflated by $ 10 
Million.206 
     The 1998 Congo war turned out to be a big blessing for the regime as so many 
military officers benefited in one way or another. During this war Saleh set up a lucrative 
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transport business involved in ferrying military personnel and equipment. He secured 
himself a tender worth $0.4 Million a month. Another businessman, Andrew Rugasira 
who has close links with military officers was also awarded a tender worth $4.5 Million 
during the same conflict to transport equipment and military personnel.207 It should also 
be remembered that Kazini, Saleh and Saleh’s wife, Joviah were adversely mentioned in 
the 2001 report by the UN panel of experts for plundering Congo’s wealth.208 The figures 
especially in the smuggling of gold are mind-boggling. After the publication of the report 
it did not surprise many when Museveni came out strongly to defend his men against the 
accusations terming them as baseless. Museveni was heavily involved in all of this as he 
was personally involved in choosing companies to award tenders and this was done 
without any bidding. By the turn of the Millennium Museveni’s men had stolen Hundreds 
of Millions of dollars meaning that by the time elections were held in 2001, Besigye, the 
opposition candidate found it difficult to compete with Museveni’s juggernaut. All those 
involved in these military scandals had personal or business ties to the first family and it 
was not lost to observers that this money was to be used to fund the General election 
campaigns. After this election attention was focused on 2006 which required a lot of 
money because of the various tasks one being the amendment of the constitution to 
enable Museveni run again. 
  During the 2004/5 financial year donors predictably refused to endorse the 
Ugandan budget due to a high increase in the defence budget which had shot up by 19%  
that year and 48% since 2002. Reasons cited for this were that the military was very 
corrupt and inefficient but after some modifications the money was eventually 
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disbursed.209 However this was not the end of the scandals since in 2006, an election 
year, $25 Million was lost by UPDF by paying up salaries to ghost soldiers. Those behind 
the scam were arrested, court martialled but their cases were never pursued to completion 
lending credence to rumours that someone high in the government was the real 
beneficiary210 
   From the cases mentioned it’s clear that corruption in Uganda is used to fund 
Museveni’s regime and this could not be possible without assurance from the donors that 
more funding is forthcoming. Budget support gives a regime an assurance of taking care 
of any deficit in the budget thus giving a regime the green-light to use money from any 
other source to prop itself. However in the corruption involving the military it was clear 
that the government was inflating its budget in order to steal as much as possible. The 
donors had a chance to stop what was happening but they continued dishing out money 
that ended up in personal pockets and which was eventually crucial in funding the re-
elections of Museveni. 
The following section looks at some of the efforts directed at fighting corruption in 
Uganda.  
 
4.4 Institutional framework for fighting corruption 
 
 Credit goes to Museveni for having initiated the war on graft. He took over 
leadership of a country that had broken down in terms of institutions like the judiciary, 
the civil service was also bloated and in tatters. Corruption was outlined in point 7 of 
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Museveni’s ten-point programs designed to map the way forward for the new 
administration. However, as Ruzindana aptly puts it, the inevitable was soon to happen 
since in Africa those who gain power for the first time are often poor people and are 
suddenly surrounded by the trappings and perks of power hence can’t resist corruption. 
Soon corruption not only becomes a way of the rich enriching themselves but also for 
political survival.211 
 
  Because elite corruption is part and parcel of defeating democracy in Uganda, 
there’s little hope that the instruments erected by the government to combat the vice will 
achieve the desired results. Recent events involving the NSSF saga convinces sceptics 
like Rukare that indeed the president has engaged in a selective graft war since the 
ministers involved were left untouched but the managers at the firm were suspended, it is 
a case of going for the small fish while letting the big fish swim212. It should be noted that 
the ministers involved are very important for the president’s re-election campaign hence 
the decision to let them of the hook did not go unnoticed. 
   Donors have the ability to eliminate the vice by invoking the considerable 
influence they have over the country but the fact that they have constantly portrayed 
Uganda and Museveni as success stories in effective governance its highly unlikely that 
they will have a go at Museveni. Voices against graft in Uganda have been muted partly 
because of the donor’s disinterest in fighting corruption and also due to Museveni’s 
machinations that has built an elaborate patronage network incorporating those that 
would have resisted graft 
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The global integrity Report of 2006 brings both good and bad news on the 
corruption war. While the legislation enacted to fight graft earns a maximum 100% mark, 
the law enforcement which is supposed to complement the actual legislation fairs badly 
and earns a miserly 50% which is a weak score213. This effectively means legislators are 
doing their bit by enacting appropriate laws but so long as the enforcement of those laws 
remains weak then the war on graft will not make any headway.  
Significantly, the executive and political financing get very low scores which 
concur with the findings of this paper. The executive gets 63% and political financing 
gets 57% which are weak and very weak scores respectively; this in effect is a guilty 
verdict on the executive for not doing enough to fight graft214. Party activities are also not 
financed in a transparent manner. The fact that budget processes manage a moderate 
score of 57%215 vindicates this paper’s assertion that the looters are carefully and usually 
cover their tracks, thanks to the free hand that budget support affords them in making and 
implementing deceitfully transparent looking budgets.  
The next section looks at some of the measures put in place to tackle corruption: 
 
4.4.1 Inspector General of Government (IGG) 
This has been in existence since 1986 and was provided in the 1995 new Ugandan 
constitution. Its mandate is to look into the conduct of leaders in public institutions, 
politicians and those in courts, army and those in other security organisations.216 It is also 
supposed to protect human rights and rules of law, at first it was directly responsible to 
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the president but after the change of the constitution in 1995 it was meant to be 
answerable to the parliament.217 
  In 2002 it was granted powers to prosecute corruption cases but the powers were 
watered down a year later by the parliament. To its credit, it has unearthed a number of 
corruption cases which have led to the suspension and dismissal of those found to be 
involved in acts of corruption. Lack of funds and proper funding are hindering its 
operations.218 
The IGG boasts of an average of 4000 complete investigations annually giving it a good 
PR in the face of the donors and the expectant public. However when one takes a closer 
look its evident that the big shots have not been touched by this body.219 
With a politically inclined figure such as Jotham Tusimwegyue at the helm, few expect 
the war on corruption to succeed given that he was a long serving NRM official.220 
 
4.4.2 Director of Public Prosecutions 
His mandate is to support investigations and institute criminal proceedings in all 
branches of law in Uganda. He has been given immense powers by the prevention of 
corruption Act 1970 which dictates that he investigates and prosecutes cases of 
corruption and bribery but like other bodies created to fight corruption he has not made 
any headway.221 
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4.4.3 National Fraud Squad 
 Despite constantly leading in corruption, the police force is expected to play a 
crucial role in the anti-corruption crusade by investigating and detaining those singled 
out. The National Fraud Squad was formed in 1996 with its operations mainly 
concentrated in Kampala. It begun operations with a core team of 35 officers but the 
force increased and some officers were dispatched to other Districts. With a watchful 
public the NFS can apprehend culprits and at the same time act as an important 
deterrent.222 
 
4.4.4 Judiciary 
 It’s charged with prosecuting those found to have engaged in acts of corruption 
but that has not always been successful due to loopholes in anti-corruption legislations. 
Other cases are usually lost due to an inefficient prosecuting team which is usually led by 
the police.223 Good example is when Saleh appeared in court to answer charges of 
receiving US$0.8 from businessman Mr. Katto for the junk helicopters. The case just died 
without any progress due to a compromised judiciary.224 
4.4.5 Auditor General 
  Articles 154 and 163 in the constitution empowers the Auditor General to control 
withdrawals from public coffers and to audit public accounts of the republic of Uganda 
The AG audits and reports on the public accounts of Uganda and accounts of all public 
offices including courts, local governments, administration and other public institutions’ 
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annual reports to the minister of finance who then submits it directly to the speaker of 
Parliament within two weeks. The Public accounts committee is then required to assess 
the report in liaison with permanent secretaries who are usually the accounting officers of 
each ministry.225 
4.4.6 Public Accounts Committee 
    Its major role is to scrutinise the report of the AG. Under the Ugandan constitution the 
PAC has the same powers as the high court and can order the police to investigate and 
initiate disciplinary and legal proceedings. However PAC’s work has not been smooth in 
a parliament dominated by NRM Members and where Museveni wields considerable 
influence.226 
 
4.4.7 Ministry of Ethics and Integrity 
  Was created in 1998 and mandated to come up with new laws to deal with 
corruption. The ministry immediately established a Directorate of Ethics and Integrity to 
lead and coordinate efforts to fight corruption. The directorate has come up with a plan 
which among other things aims to coordinate government efforts and chase the high 
profile cases which the government has adopted.227 
  Efforts by the President to fight corruption through multiple agencies are 
commendable since it shows a political will to deal with the problem on the president’s 
part. This approach however makes coordination difficult due to the sheer number of 
institutions involved. These institutions lack real power as was the case with the police 
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prevention of corruption Act which failed to lack of a strong anti-corruption law. Now 
there’s the whistleblowers Protection Bill on parliament and a new Anti-corruption Bill is 
in the offing but with so much at stake, people are cautioned not to be too optimistic. 
Political interference where at times the president steps in to terminate some of the cases 
greatly hampers the work of these institutions; there is too much political interference 
which goes to the appointment of politicians with close ties to the president to head some 
of the institutions. The President might also be creating these bodies to hoodwink the 
international community into believing that indeed he is serious with the war on 
corruption.  
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CHAPTER 5 
5.1 Conclusion 
  This thesis manages to implicate budget support in thwarting Ugandan’s quest for 
a democratic country. This conclusion is drawn from a critical examination of the 
symbiotic relationship between the Ugandan predatory elite and donors who have been 
careful not to tarnish the success myth of the Museveni regime. By opting to give aid in 
the form of budget support, the donors have knowingly or unknowingly supplied an 
endless flow of cash that has funded the regime’s further stay in office. Ugandan elite are 
allowed to steal from the state coffers as long as they are still fulfilling the donor’s 
priorities which are purely economic ignoring the urgent political needs of the Ugandan 
people. Donors also come under serious pressure to meet certain aid targets and more 
often Uganda being a ‘success’ story becomes a beneficiary. This is usually helped by the 
perception that the country has managed to manage its economy better than most African 
countries 
  The fact that budget support puts emphasis on economic reforms enables 
Museveni to use his late 1980’s and early 1990’s economic credentials which has ensured 
that he remains in good books with the donors. The predictable and reliable nature of this 
form of aid allows the predatory elite to steal by awarding themselves inflated contracts 
knowing very well that more money will be forthcoming from the donors to offset any 
deficit in the national budget. Museveni becomes an accomplice when he openly defends 
those that engage in graft and the fact that all of them have close ties with the first family 
lends credence to the claim these people are funding National Resistance Movement 
Party activities, this will help them continue looting and it will also shield them from 
possible prosecution unlike in a scenario where another regime takes over. Corruption 
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cases usually increase just before general elections and during important legislations 
which is not surprising since most of the loot is used in campaigns to bribe voters and 
Parliamentarians in the case of legislations. Museveni was able to amend the constitution 
in order to have another shot at presidency after openly bribing legislators; this proved 
that all the major scandals that had been taking place just before 2005 were aimed at 
funding his extended stay in power. Similar scenarios have been witnessed during other 
elections. Amana Mbabazi, the NRM Secretary General and Internal Security Minister 
together with his Foreign Affairs counterpart, Sam Kutesa together with others have 
come under fire for their involvement in corruption which some legislators have linked to 
Museveni’s fourth term, some have gone on record to say that Mbabazi is pouring money 
to ensure that those members who don’t subscribe to NRM ideals are not re-elected in the 
2011 General elections. Museveni on his part has continued to defend these men meaning 
that he is the real beneficiary of their activities 
The military’s role in Ugandan politics can not be ignored. Senior military 
officials wield immense powers due to their closeness to the President and evidence 
suggest that they engage in corruption not only to enrich themselves but also to fund 
Museveni’s extended stay in office. Donors place great premium on security and have 
been too willing to adjust military spending upwards which explains why the military has 
been involved in some of the biggest scams and also why the president always ensures 
that close family members are in charge. 
      Anti-corruption institutions should be shielded from political interferences in order to 
work effectively. The president has demonstrated a willingness to fight graft by 
supporting crucial Bills aimed at curbing the vice but the lack of political will in actual 
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implementation of the law hampers the efforts. This then calls for donors to be on the 
forefront of fighting corruption and can be done by pressurizing the president to reign on 
some of his men and if this does not work then aid suspension should be considered. 
Donors can exercise the immense powers they wield and ask the president to take certain 
steps geared towards increasing the democratic space in the country; one such step would 
be to call on the president to ensure a level playing field for all political players and to 
enact and adhere to laws guiding political funding. Donors also need to monitor the 
spending of the cash they are pumping into the country to curb cases of corruption. It 
beats logic to continue complaining about corruption but fail to put in place mechanisms 
to deal with the problem. If budget support is the preferred mode of transferring aid then 
some of its main tenets should be reconsidered to improve accountability instead of only 
relying on past records and reputation to lend. 
 For Uganda to truly embrace democracy and for the regime to be more 
accountable and receptive to the wishes of the people then budget support needs to be 
reconsidered, a more transparent form of aid like project support should be tried. Project 
support will ensure that donors have representatives on the ground to monitor the use of 
donor funds and this will greatly reduce cases of corruption.  
Another option would be to drastically reduce the reliance on donor funds. This is 
not an easy option and it will face a number of obstacles but once Ugandans learn to live 
within their means then the regime will be forced to be more transparent in its spending 
and also there will be less money at their disposal to steal. With reduced aid the Museveni 
regime will be forced to source for alternative ways of getting revenue locally which will 
call for stringent measures that will in the end improve fiscal discipline. This will see the 
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government tighten regulations governing taxation thereby putting a seal on a major 
corruption outlet. Regulations governing government tenders also need to be looked at to 
avoid a situation where the executive awards tenders unilaterally. If the recommendations 
above are observed then the regime will no doubt be transparent, and in the end 
democracy will be a big winner, however, if action is not taken then Museveni will get a 
fourth term and the possibility of a life presidency will be high. 
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